that the issue is subject to scholarly disagreement. The sound view is that he should allot a turn to an insane wife on the condition that she is not dangerous; if she is dangerous, then he should not allot her a turn.

But would anyone be content for his wife to be an insane woman who is dangerous? We say: at the outset, I do not think anyone would marry an insane and dangerous woman. However, this insanity may occur for a limited period. In that case, we say that he should allot her a turn. Perhaps, when he does so, calms her, and speaks with her, she may respond and her insanity may leave her, as sometimes happens in reality.

His statement, “and others,” means women other than those mentioned—for example, a wife concerning whom he has taken an oath of abstinence, one whom he has declared unlawful to himself by likening her to a permanently unmarriageable relative, or one prevented by some impediment, such as being fasting. He must allot her a turn. That is, even a wife with whom he cannot have intercourse is entitled to her turn, except where custom dictates otherwise or where she willingly waives it.

Thus, if he were to say to her, for example, “You are ill, and it is difficult for me to allot you a turn; will you permit this?” then, if she permits it, there is no harm, because the right belongs to her. Likewise, if she is an elderly woman and he says to her, “I am unable to allot you a turn. Would you prefer to remain with me, still married to me but without a turn, or shall I divorce you?” and she chooses to remain with him, this is permissible.

If someone were to say, “She chose this only under compulsion, out of fear of divorce,” we would say: yes, the right belongs to her, but it is permissible here, because compulsion in the matter of separation concerns his right. Thus, he may say: if she wishes to remain with her children and in her home, then so be it; but if she does not wish to, then I do not want anything to remain as a liability upon me, so I will divorce her and be relieved of the matter.