is the same as the ruling of menstruation with regard to what is permitted, such as a man enjoying intimacy with his wife without intercourse, and passing through the mosque when there is no risk of soiling it.

His statement, “and what is prohibited,” means that it is like menstruation with regard to what is prohibited, such as fasting, prayer, intercourse, circumambulation of the Ka‘bah, and divorce, according to the author’s wording.

His statement, “and what is obligatory,” means that it is like menstruation with regard to what is obligatory, such as performing ghusl when she becomes pure.

His statement, “and what is waived,” means that it is like menstruation with regard to what is waived on account of it, such as fasting and prayer: both are waived for her, although she must make up the fasts, whereas the prayers are not made up.

His statement, “except for the waiting period,” means that postnatal bleeding differs from menstruation with respect to the waiting period.

Menstruation is counted as part of the waiting period, whereas postnatal bleeding is not counted as part of it.

For example, if a man divorces his wife, she observes a waiting period of three menstrual cycles, and each menstrual cycle is counted as part of the waiting period.

Postnatal bleeding, however, is not counted, because if he divorces her before she gives birth, her waiting period ends with delivery; and if he divorces her after delivery, she waits for three menstrual cycles. Thus, postnatal bleeding has no bearing whatsoever on the waiting period.

His statement, “and puberty,” means that it differs from menstruation with respect to puberty; that is, menstruation is one of the signs of puberty.

As for pregnancy, it is not one of the signs of puberty, because when she becomes pregnant, she has