His statement, “if there is one,” means: if there is a deceiver.

Deception may come from the wife: she may have a defect which she concealed from her guardian. The guardian then concludes the marriage contract, the husband consummates the marriage and discovers the defect. In this case, the wife is the deceiver, and her guardian bears no liability, because he did not know.

If the guardian knew, and she too knew, then upon whom does liability fall? Either it falls upon both of them equally, or upon the guardian, because the direct act of deception came from the guardian. It is not customary for a woman to go out to the husband and tell him that she has such-and-such a defect.

Thus, there are two possible views in this matter:

The first is that liability is shared between the guardian and the woman, because each of them engaged in deception.

The second is that it falls upon the guardian, because he was the one directly involved in concluding the contract. If he knew that the woman under his guardianship had a defect, he was obliged to disclose it. The guardian said, “I have given you her in marriage,” and the husband said, “I accept.” This is the stronger view: when the deception comes from both the woman and her guardian, liability rests with the guardian.

If the guardian alone is the deceiver—for example, if he learns of a defect after the woman has been examined by doctors, while she herself does not know of it—then liability in this case rests with the guardian. For if we hold that, when deception comes from both her and her guardian, liability rests with the guardian, then this case is even more deserving of that ruling.

If there is no deception, neither from the woman nor from her guardian—for example, if the defect is vitiligo on her back—then it will most likely be hidden from her and from