many other defects which they stated are not defects. Yet the Shariah cannot distinguish between two alike cases, nor ever treat two different cases alike. When two matters are alike, their ruling is the same; and when they differ, their rulings differ. This is a general principle throughout the Shariah. At times, a person may think that two things differ when they do not, or that they are separate when they are not; in that case, the error lies in his misunderstanding, not in the ruling of the Shariah.

“Even if it arose after the marriage contract …”

His statement, “Even if it arose after the marriage contract,” means: even if the defect arose after the contract, the party entitled to do so may annul the marriage. Defects may arise after the contract, or may have existed beforehand, as is clear. For example, vaginal obstruction, vaginal tearing, and similar conditions in a woman exist before the contract; whereas impotence, according to the stronger view, may arise and occur after the contract.

His statement, “Even if it arose after the marriage contract,” indicates a point of disagreement. Some scholars hold that if a defect arises after the contract and its harm does not extend beyond the affected person, there is no option of annulment. This is analogous to a defect arising in merchandise after its sale: the purchaser has no option, because it became defective while in his ownership. Likewise, if it arises after the marriage contract, there is no option of annulment.

This view may be applicable to some defects. As for others, however, there should be no disagreement. If complete insanity—may Allah protect us—arises after the contract, then to say that the woman has no option would be problematic, for it would oblige her to remain with an insane man, fearing for herself and her children from him. This cannot be upheld by