one may have preceded the other. Therefore, both marriages must be annulled. The consequence of this is that one of the two women is entitled to half of the bridal dower. If we were to say that they were invalid, neither would be owed anything, since an invalid contract does not entail a bridal dower, and consummation did not take place such that we could say the dower became fully due through consummation. This, then, is the difference.
The judge is the one responsible for annulling both marriages. He says, “I decree the annulment of the marriage,” and annuls it. One of the two women is then entitled to half of the bridal dower, because she is considered divorced before consummation. Which of them is entitled to half of the dower? We say: lots are drawn between them, because this falls under financial matters. Whichever of them is selected by the lot is entitled to half of the dower. Neither of them is required to observe a waiting period, because consummation did not occur.
However, if the actual circumstances later become clear—if it becomes apparent that both contracts took place simultaneously—then no dower is due from him, and what was paid is to be returned. But if it becomes apparent that one of them preceded the other, then, in my view, this requires further consideration. We may say that drawing lots is like a judicial ruling; or we may say that lots are drawn only to distinguish what is unclear, and once the uncertainty has been removed, the dower should be returned to the woman whose marriage is shown to have been the first.
“A woman observing a waiting period, and a woman undergoing istibrāʾ due to another man, are forbidden in marriage, …”
His statement, “A woman observing a waiting period is forbidden,” means that a woman observing a waiting period due to another man is forbidden to anyone other than her husband. We have previously explained this in detail at the beginning of the Book of Marriage.
Thus, no one may marry a woman observing a waiting period due to another man, even if she has been irrevocably divorced with a final major separation, because the right of the first husband remains attached to her. It has already been explained that it is not even permissible to propose to her explicitly; only an indirect allusion is permitted.
But if someone marries a woman who is observing a waiting period due to another man, we say that the contract is undoubtedly invalid, because Allah says, “Do not resolve on the marriage tie until the prescribed term reaches its end.”