The first is: “the umm walad of a disbeliever who embraces Islam.” That is, a disbelieving man has a slave-woman with whom he has intercourse, and she then bears him a child, thereby becoming his umm walad. He may not sell her, because she is an umm walad; but he may marry her off, because she remains his property until he dies. When he dies, she becomes free. This is based on the view that selling ummahāt al-awlād is prohibited; the issue is one over which there is scholarly disagreement. The author did not say, “such as a Muslim slave-woman belonging to a disbeliever,” because this is inconceivable: if a slave-woman embraces Islam while owned by a disbeliever, he is compelled to relinquish his ownership of her, whether by selling her, manumitting her, or otherwise.

The second is: “a disbelieving slave-woman belonging to a Muslim.” That is, a Muslim owns a slave-woman who is a disbeliever. He may marry her off because he is her master. We do not say to him, “You are Muslim and she is a disbeliever, so you must be compelled to relinquish ownership,” because the master holds a higher position.

The third is: “the ruler may marry off a protected non-Muslim woman who has no guardian.” What is meant by “the ruler” is the imam, the supreme head of state, or whoever acts on his behalf. In our present time, the body acting on his behalf is the Ministry of Justice, with the marriage registrar acting under it. Thus, if there is a protected non-Muslim woman who has no guardian, he may marry her off, even though she is a disbeliever and he is a Muslim.

The apparent view of the companions of the school is that a Muslim may not marry off a disbelieving woman under his guardianship, such as his daughter, sister, or paternal aunt, even though he is superior to them. It is certainly true that a disbeliever may not marry off a Muslim woman under his guardianship. But there is something troubling about the view that a Muslim may not marry off a disbelieving woman. If the matter is one of consensus, then it cannot be departed from. But if there is a difference of opinion, then the preponderant view in my opinion is that, if the guardian is superior to the woman in religion, there is no harm in his marrying her off, because this is a form of guardianship; and if it is guardianship, then whoever is