your daughter.” Yet this man is not a suitable match. If the father agrees and marries his daughter to him, saying, “I have the right to compel my daughter,” and takes the million, then such a person cannot be appointed as a guardian, and his guardianship is invalid. He must possess sound judgment in contracting marriage.
Even if we assume that this guardian has sound judgment in contracting marriage, knows the interests involved in marriage, knows suitable matches, and knows people thoroughly, but lacks sound judgment in his buying and selling and is not competent at conducting transactions, this does not matter. Sound judgment in every matter is determined according to that particular matter. So long as the man knows the interests of marriage, the suitable match, the wife’s due rights, and everything connected with marriage, he possesses sound judgment and may marry her off.
“And sameness of religion—except in cases to be mentioned—and uprightness, …”
The fifth is his statement: “sameness of religion,” meaning that the guardian and the woman must share the same religion, whether Islam or another religion. This is because guardianship is severed between those who differ in religion. Evidence that this bond is severed is that the adherents of two different religions do not inherit from one another. If the bond is severed with respect to inheritance, then its severance with respect to guardianship is even more warranted.
Accordingly, a Christian may marry his Christian daughter off, and likewise a Jew may marry his Jewish daughter off; and the same principle applies in analogous cases. May a Muslim marry off his Christian daughter? According to the author’s wording, he may not. Likewise, a Christian may not marry off his Muslim daughter. However, he made exceptions, saying:
“Except in cases to be mentioned.” In al-Rawḍ (1), he said: “Such as the umm walad of a disbeliever who embraces Islam, a disbelieving slave-woman belonging to a Muslim, and the ruler marrying off a protected non-Muslim woman who has no guardian.” These are three cases in which sameness of religion is not stipulated: