he is fourteen years, eleven months, and twenty-eight days old. Accordingly, if a woman has a paternal uncle qualified to act as guardian, and also has a younger brother who has not reached puberty, it is her paternal uncle who marries her off; her full brother may not marry her off, even if only one day remains until he reaches puberty.

The second is his statement, “male sex,” the opposite of which is femininity and ambiguous sex. If a woman may not marry herself off, then how could she marry someone else off? Accordingly, a mother may not marry off her daughter, since male sex is a condition. If she has a mother and a paternal cousin, and she comes asking, “Who is my guardian?” we say: her paternal cousin. A female cannot be a guardian.

Likewise, a person of ambiguous sex may not marry someone off. Praise be to Allah, this is rare, as mentioned previously. In any case, one must understand that the stipulation of male sex excludes both femininity and ambiguous sex.

Male sex is required for every form of guardianship except guardianship connected to women. There is no objection to a woman serving as guardian in that case. Thus, a woman cannot be the principal of a men’s school, but she may be the principal of a women’s school. Nor can she be a minister in a ministry for men. But can she be a minister in a ministry for women? The answer is yes. Yet this is not possible at present, because even a women’s ministry, women’s administration, or women’s leadership must include men.

The third is his statement, “freedom,” meaning that the guardian must be free. Thus, a slave may not marry off his daughter, even if he is among the most intelligent of people, the soundest in judgment, and the most upright in religion, because he is himself owned and does not independently control his own person or benefits; therefore, he cannot be a guardian over another.