a refusal; but if the surrounding indication does not show that, then it does not indicate refusal.

His statement, “It is the silence of the virgin and the spoken response of the previously married woman”: if the matter were reversed—such that the virgin said, “Yes, I wish to marry this man, and I accept him,” while the previously married woman remained silent—would that constitute permission?

As for the previously married woman, it would not constitute permission, because speech is more emphatic than silence. Her saying, “I accept,” is more emphatic than her merely remaining silent. As for the virgin, however, it would constitute permission, because her speaking and saying, “I accept him,” indicates her approval more clearly than silence does.

Remarkably, Ibn Hazm, because of his literalist approach, held that if she expressly stated her approval, it would not constitute permission. Thus, if she said, “I accept this man, I want him, and I do not want anyone else,” he would say: This is not permission, because the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, was asked how her permission is given, and he replied: “That she remains silent.” (1) This means, according to him, that if she gave permission in a manner other than silence, it would not be legally recognized.

This is a weak view, and it demonstrates the flaw of adhering to the outward wording without considering the meaning. For all the outward rulings of the Shariah are true, and all contain wisdoms and secrets. It is not wise for us to ask one woman, “Are you willing to marry this man?” and for her to reply, “Yes, I accept him,” then ask another woman, “Are you willing to marry this man?” and for her to remain silent, and then say that the second is willing while the first is not.

The correct view is that the least form of a virgin’s permission is silence, while its highest form is speech; but