years from the time he disappeared. Thus, if two men disappear, each of them being eighty-eight years old, and the circumstances of one man’s disappearance indicate survival, while those of the other indicate death, we wait two years in the case of the one whose disappearance apparently indicates survival, and four years in the case of the other, whose disappearance apparently indicates death. This is unreasonable! How can we say that, in the case of one whose disappearance apparently indicates death and who is eighty-eight years old, we wait four years, whereas in the case of one whose disappearance apparently indicates survival and who is eighty-eight years old, we wait two years?! The matter ought to be the reverse.
They only fixed this period on the basis of transmitted authority—that is, reason has no scope in this matter—because this is what has been reported from the Companions (1). Yet we may say: what has been reported from the Companions concerns particular cases, and rulings concerning particular cases are not fixed by transmitted authority. For particular cases mean that we examine each matter individually; and if they are particular cases, then this is a matter of legal reasoning. Thus, the stronger view in this issue is that it is referred to the judgment of the imam, or of whomever the imam appoints to adjudicate. People differ: there are some people whose death becomes known to us after only one year, because he is a well-known man, recognized wherever he goes. If he disappears, it is enough to search for him for one year. And there are others who are ordinary people, mingling among people, and