Muslim; thus, she falls under the author’s earlier statement: “A Muslim’s appointment by will is valid in favor of every Muslim.” Indeed, many women care for their children far better than men do.

His statement, “Whoever is appointed by will for a particular matter does not become an executor in other matters”: if someone is appointed by will to oversee a person’s children, he has no authority to manage their property, because overseeing the children is different from overseeing their property.

Likewise, if someone is appointed by will to develop the wealth of a person’s minor children, he does not have custody of them, because an appointment by will is analogous to an agency; it is confined to the matter for which the person was appointed. The same applies to everyone acting as another’s representative: he may not go beyond the limits set for him. Judges provide an example. If the Ministry of Justice appoints a man as a judge in matrimonial matters, he does not hear inheritance cases; if it appoints him as a judge in inheritance cases, he does not hear sales cases; and if it appoints him as a judge in sales cases, he does not hear cases concerning the division of inheritances—and so on.

Thus, agency and appointments by will are restricted to the matters for which they were assigned and extend no further. Accordingly, we say: whoever is appointed by will for one matter is not an executor in any other matter. The reason is that such an executor acts by authorization, and so he must confine himself to what he has been authorized to do and not exceed it. This is a clear rationale, free of any ambiguity.

His statement, “If, after the executor has distributed the estate, a debt appears against the deceased that exhausts his estate, the executor is not liable”: this is an important issue. If a debt owed by the deceased comes to light after the executor has acted and disbursed the bequeathed property for its designated purpose, then he bears no liability