The same also applies to what his animal may bear. If he says, “I bequeath to so-and-so whatever this ewe bears,” but it bears nothing, then the beneficiary may not demand from the heirs the equivalent of its offspring each year. Rather, the bequest is invalid, since the bequeathed property cannot be received.

His statement, “A bequest is valid with respect to a hunting dog”: for example, a man owns a trained hunting dog and bequeaths it to someone. We say that the bequest is valid, even though a hunting dog is not considered property; nevertheless, its use has been permitted. The same applies to gifting it. As for selling a hunting dog, this is not valid, because the Prophet ﷺ forbade the sale of dogs (1). In reality, bequeathing it means that the testator relinquishes this dog, for the testator himself does not own the dog. The sphere of charitable disposal is broader than that of exchange contracts.

His statement, “and the like”: that is, dogs comparable to hunting dogs, such as guard dogs for crops and livestock, because the benefit of all three of these is lawful, as mentioned in the hadith (2). Thus, if one bequeaths a hunting dog, a crop-guarding dog, or a livestock-guarding dog, the bequest is valid.

But if he bequeaths a dog that is not for one of these three purposes, nor for anything analogous to them, then the bequest is invalid, because the testator has no right to make use of this bequeathed item.

His statement, “and impure oil”: that is, oil that has become contaminated, not oil that is intrinsically impure; there is a difference between them. Intrinsically impure matter—