The second view is that if he bequeaths it to Zayd and then bequeaths it to Amr, it belongs to the latter of the two, because bequeathing it to the second constitutes a revocation of the bequest to the first. This is the correct view: the first has no share in it. This is also the practice people follow today.

Likewise, if he bequeaths a house to be used for a certain purpose, then bequeaths it again, saying that it is to be used for another purpose, do we say that it is to be used for both purposes, or for the latter one?

The answer is that this depends on the difference of opinion. This is why I previously mentioned that, when a testator writes a will, he should state: “This will supersedes what preceded it,” so that no confusion arises among the heirs and the beneficiary of the bequest.

This also shows that it is permissible to make a bequest conditional, and this is indeed the case: a bequest may be made subject to a condition. There are many examples of this. One is where he says: “If Zayd seeks knowledge, then this library shall be his.” Then, if the testator dies after Zayd has sought knowledge, the bequest is valid, because a bequest is a voluntary gift, not an exchange contract.

All obligatory dues—debts, Hajj, and otherwise—are to be discharged from all of his property after his death, even if he did not make a bequest concerning them.

His statement, “All obligatory dues—debts, Hajj, and otherwise—are to be discharged from all of his property after his death, even if he did not make a bequest concerning them,” means that, when a person dies, five rights become attached to his estate:

First: his funeral preparation. Second: secured debt. Third: unsecured debt. Fourth: the bequest. Fifth: inheritance.

What relates to the funeral preparation takes precedence. Thus, if he dies leaving one hundred riyals, and he cannot be prepared for burial except at a cost of one hundred, we use it for his preparation, even if he owes a debt. This is because preparing him is akin to the clothing, food, and drink of an insolvent debtor: it is a personal necessity. Thus, just as