and if it so happens that he dies, the lease remains in effect until its term ends; then the poor may reside in it, because it has been bequeathed to them.
If someone were to ask: How can revocation of a bequest be permissible?
We reply: Because it does not take effect until after death. From this we also know that a gift made conditional upon a stipulation is valid, contrary to the established school of jurisprudence. For example, if he says to someone, “If you marry, I give you this house as a gift for you and your wife to live in,” this is permissible, because Muslims are bound by their conditions, except for a condition that makes lawful what is unlawful or makes unlawful what is lawful. The correct view is that conditionality is permissible in all contracts, unless such a condition establishes something invalid or nullifies a right.
“If he says, ‘If Zayd arrives, then he shall have what I have bequeathed to Amr,’ and Zayd arrives during the testator’s lifetime, it belongs to him; but if he arrives afterwards, it belongs to Amr.”
His statement, “If he says,” means: the testator.
His statement, “If Zayd arrives, then he shall have what I have bequeathed to Amr, and he arrives,” means Zayd.
His statement, “during his lifetime, it belongs to him,” means during the testator’s lifetime. In that case, the bequeathed property belongs to Zayd, because he arrived before Amr acquired the bequest.
His statement, “but if he arrives afterwards, it belongs to Amr,” means after the testator’s lifetime. Thus, if Zayd arrives after the testator’s death, it belongs to Amr, because when the man died, the beneficiary’s right became attached to this particular property, and his right cannot be invalidated on account of Zayd’s arrival. This applies whether Zayd arrives before Amr accepts the bequest or after he accepts it. If he arrives after Amr’s acceptance, the matter is clear, since Amr has acquired it. If he arrives before his acceptance, it is because Amr’s right had become attached to it.
This is based on what has preceded regarding the permissibility of revoking a bequest, because