their permission is valid. For this reason, we prohibited him from making a gift in excess of one-third, since their right is attached to his wealth. Here, they are waiving their right to object; they are not giving away the property, because they do not yet own it. Evidence for this is that a person in a terminal illness cannot give away more than one-third because of their right. If we were to say that their right arises only after death, we would have to say that he may give away whatever he wishes. But if they approve it while he is healthy, there is no basis for their approval, and it is not recognized. This is the sound view: if they permit a bequest exceeding one-third, or a bequest to one of the heirs, there is no harm in it when it is made during a terminal illness in which death is feared. But while he is healthy, their approval carries no weight.

A bequest to one of the heirs may be, for example, that he gathers them and says: “My children, your younger brother is in greater need. You are employed, whereas he is still a minor. I wish to bequeath to him an amount equal to his share of inheritance, or more.” They agree to this. The stronger view is that such agreement is effective and permissible—unless we know that they consented merely out of shyness and embarrassment, in which case such permission carries no weight.

Question: If he bequeaths to every heir an amount equal to his share—for instance, he has four sons and says, “I bequeath one quarter to each of them”—this is permissible, because it involves no injustice to anyone. But if he makes a bequest to specified heirs equal to their respective shares—for example, he has four sons and owns four apartments of equal value—may he bequeath to each son an apartment equal to his share? According to the madhhab, there is no harm in this.

The second view is that it is invalid, and this is more correct, even if they are equal in value.