his property. Nor is the approval of an insane person valid, for he has neither intent, will, nor reason. Likewise, the approval of a financially incompetent person—one who does not know how to manage wealth properly—is of no consequence.
His statement, “after death,” qualifies “approval”; that is, unless the heirs approve it after death. If they approve it before death, their approval is of no consequence, because they do not yet own the property and therefore cannot make a voluntary gift of any part of it. Approval, in fact, amounts to making a voluntary gift. Moreover, the person who is an heir today may himself become the one inherited from: it often happens that one man is healthy while another is gravely ill, yet the former dies before the latter. Thus, their approval is not recognized unless it comes after death.
Accordingly, if a sick person, upon seeing that his death is near, gathers his heirs and says to them: “My wealth amounts to one hundred thousand, and I wish to make a bequest for the construction of a mosque. Constructing the mosque will cost fifty thousand, so will you permit this?” They reply, “Yes, we permit it,” and then he dies—should the construction of the mosque be carried out?
The answer is: only the amount that does not exceed one-third is to be executed; as for what exceeds one-third, it is not. If someone were to say, “But they willingly allowed it and gave permission,” the response is that they gave permission before they came to own the property, for they do not own it until the death of the deceased. Their permission is therefore no different from the permission of someone who is not an heir, because at that point they are neither heirs nor owners of the property. Nor can one know for certain: perhaps this sick person, whose death is feared to be near, will outlive those who are healthy. This happens often.
The second view is that their approval before death is valid without qualification.
The third view is a distinction: if his illness is one from which death is feared, then