Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (11/91)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

he gives each of his two sons a car, then later takes back the car of one of them. This retraction is not valid, because it is intended to give preference to the other child.

His statement, “regarding his binding gift, except for the father,” indicates that if he remits a debt owed to him by his son, he may not retract it, because remission is not a gift; rather, it is the waiver of a right.

His statement, “except for the father,” excludes the grandfather: he may not take back what he gave to his grandson through his son or to his grandson through his daughter. It also excludes the mother: she may not take back what she gave her son.

If someone asks: What is the evidence?

We reply: It is the general purport of the statement, “The one who takes back his gift is like a dog,” and a general expression includes all individuals unless the Sacred Law provides evidence excluding something from it. Otherwise, it remains general for every case. Analogical reasoning is not valid here, because analogy conflicts with the general wording. Thus, the basic ruling is that if a woman gives a gift to her sons or daughters, it is not lawful for her to take it back.

His statement, “except for the father”: do we need to say, “except for the free father,” or should we say that he cannot give a gift unless he is free? We say: There is no need to qualify the father as free, because he does not give a gift except while free.

The apparent meaning of the author’s words is that a father may take back what he gave his Muslim son even if the father is a disbeliever, due to the general wording. Thus, if a wealthy disbelieving man gives something to his Muslim son, he may take it back, because the hadith is general.

“And he may take and acquire from his child’s wealth that which does not harm him and which the child does not need, …”

His statement, “And he may take and acquire from his child’s wealth”: there is, however, a necessary condition: the father must be free. Thus, we say that “he may” refers to the father, on the condition that he is free, because one who is not free owns nothing—so how could he acquire ownership? For

يعطي ولديه كل واحد سيارة، ثم عاد وأخذ من أحدهما سيارته، فهذا الرجوع لا يصح؛ لأنه يراد به تفضيل الولد الآخر. وقوله: «في هبته اللازمة إلا الأب» يستفاد منه أنه لو أبرأ ابنه من دين فليس له الرجوع؛ لأن الإبراء ليس بهبة، بل هو إسقاط. وقوله: «إلا الأب» يخرج به الجد، فليس له أن يرجع فيما وهب لابن ابنه، أو لابن بنته، ويخرج من ذلك الأم، فليس لها أن ترجع فيما وهبت لابنها. فإذا قال قائل: ما الدليل؟ قلنا: عموم «العائد في هبته كالكلب» وصيغة العموم لا يخرج منها إلا ما دل عليه الشرع، وإلا فهي عامة لجميع الأفراد، وهنا لا يصح القياس؛ لأن القياس مخالف للعموم، فالأصل أن المرأة إذا وهبت أبناءها أو بناتها، لا يحل لها أن ترجع. وقوله: «إلا الأب» هل يحتاج أن نقول: إلا الأب الحر، أو نقول: إنه لا يمكن أن يهب إلا إذا كان حراً؟ نقول: لا يحتاج أن نقيد الأب بالحر؛ لأنه لا يهب إلا وهو حر. وظاهر كلام المؤلف: أن الأب يرجع ولو كان كافراً فيما وهبه لابنه المسلم للعموم، فلو أن رجلاً غنياً كافراً وهب لابنه المسلم شيئاً فله أن يرجع؛ لأن الحديث عام. وَلَهُ أَنْ يَأْخُذَ وَيَتَمَلَّكَ مِنْ مَالِ وَلَدِهِ مَا لَا يَضُرُّهُ وَلَا يَحْتَاجُهُ، ..... قوله: «وله أن يأخذ ويتملك من مال ولده» لكن لا بد من شرط وهو أن يكون الأب حراً، فنقول: «له» يعود على الأب لكن بقيد أن يكون حراً؛ لأن غير الحر لا يملك فكيف يتملك؟! ولأن