The stronger view is that we give him payment in proportion to the stipulated reward. Thus, if it is estimated that, were he hired for it, the wage would be one hundred, whereas the stipulated reward would be eighty, we give him in proportion to the eighty. This is because the offeror is satisfied with this stipulated reward, and likewise the worker is satisfied that this reward is the compensation for his work.

So, if we assume that the stipulated reward is greater than the wage for hire—and this is usually the case, since one who enters into a reward contract generally seeks prompt completion—what do we give him? We give him in proportion to the stipulated reward.

In summary: according to the author, a reward contract is non-binding: the offeror may rescind it, and the worker may rescind it. If the worker rescinds it, he is entitled to nothing. But does he incur any liability?

We have mentioned that if this entails harm to the offeror, the worker is required to remedy the harm. For example, if the workers are no longer available and no worker can be found, the worker is required to complete the work, because he has no excuse and he is the one who has harmed the offeror. He must therefore complete it, either himself or by appointing someone to complete it, whose wage is borne by the worker.

If the offeror rescinds it, then, if this is before the work begins, the worker is entitled to nothing, because he has done no work. If it is after commencement, the worker is entitled, according to the established school, to payment for his work; but according to the stronger view, he is entitled to a proportionate share of the stipulated reward, as explained above.

But if rescission before the work begins causes harm to the worker, does the offeror bear any liability?

According to the established school, he bears no liability. A plausible view is that he must compensate the worker for the loss of the opportunity to perform the work.