His statement, “the pledgee”: this is the one in whose possession the collateral is, because the owner of the collateral is called the pledgor.

His statement, “the lessee”: that is, the one in whose possession the leased property is.

His statement, “to claim against the usurper of the property”: that is, all four of these persons may claim against the usurper of the property.

Let us begin with the depositary, namely, the person with whom the property was deposited. If the deposit is usurped, may the depositary claim against the usurper of the property? Yes.

Second: the muḍārib has merchandise in his possession that is usurped, when someone takes it by force. May he make a claim? Yes.

Third: the pledgee likewise has the collateral in his possession, and it is usurped. May he make a claim? Yes.

Fourth: the lessee—for example, someone who leases a car for two or three days—then someone comes and usurps it. May he make a claim? Yes, he may make a claim.

If the usurper says, “You are not the owner,” the reply is: “But he is acting on behalf of the owner.”

It remains to be asked: does the lām in his statement, “the depositary may,” indicate permissibility, or does it dispel an assumption that he is prohibited from doing so? It dispels the assumption of prohibition; it does not indicate mere permissibility. For if we were to say that it indicates permissibility, the depositary would have the choice whether to make a claim or not. But if we say that it dispels the assumption of prohibition—meaning that the depositary is not prevented from claiming against the usurper, and likewise those mentioned alongside him—then this does not conflict with our saying that he is obliged to make a claim, and that is indeed the case. How might such a prohibition be supposed? It may be supposed by saying: “You are not the owner, and if you are not the owner, then you have no right to make a claim, because it is possible that the owner may approve.”