did burn down, and its owner says, “Yes, the shop burned down; I have no doubt about that. But I do not concede that the deposited property was destroyed in that fire,” then the owner’s statement is not accepted, while the depositary’s statement—that it was destroyed in that fire—is accepted.

His statement, “and that there was no negligence,” is the third issue. Thus, if the owner says, “You were negligent and did not keep it in a place customarily regarded as secure for such property,” while he says, “I was not negligent,” then the depositary’s statement is accepted, because he is entrusted with it. But if both acknowledge the cause, while the owner claims that it constituted negligence and the depositary says that it did not, then the matter is referred to customary practice and presented to experts. If they say that a man who kept it in this location was not negligent, then he was not negligent; and if they say that it was negligence, then it was negligence.

This detailed distinction is the stronger view, even though the apparent meaning of the author’s words is that the depositary’s statement regarding the absence of negligence is accepted without qualification. However, this is open to question.

If someone were to ask: What if the depositary and the depositor differ over whether a particular action constitutes negligence, and the depositary says, “In my view, this was not negligence”?

The answer is: If the experts say that it was negligence while you believe that it was not, this indicates that you do not understand the matter. Ignorance is not excused in transactions between people. You were therefore obliged to ask beforehand whether this was negligence or not.

Let us give an example of this: On a cold winter night, the depositary leaves the sheep out in the open, thinking that the sheep