has the option—namely, the option of the session—and may rescind the contract even against the Muslim’s will, because this is a right connected to acquiring ownership. The same, therefore, applies to pre-emption.

The scenario in the latter case is as follows: A Muslim sells something to a disbeliever. Does the disbeliever, so long as they remain in the session during which rescission is permitted, have the right to cancel the sale? Yes, he does, because this falls under the right to acquire ownership, and he may rescind it even if the Muslim objects. This is his right and is entailed by the contract. Pre-emption too is a right, and the consequence of a partner selling to an outsider is that the original partner has the right of pre-emption.

Thus, the scholars differ over this issue. If we were to say that it should be referred to the judgment of the ruling authority—that is, the judge—this would be sound. This may be determined by the surrounding indications: if we know that the disbeliever will boast of taking the property by pre-emption from the Muslim and regard himself as having risen above him, then we should not allow him to do so. But if we know that the disbeliever is under a treaty of peace and has exercised pre-emption only because he needs it in the interest of his ownership, then we should allow him to do so.