but had dirt on it, and then, after he washed it, it became a washed garment. It is well known that a washed garment is worth less than a new one, even if the new one is soiled, for one who sees a new but soiled garment knows that it has been used only a little, whereas one who sees a washed garment assumes that it was used extensively and then washed. He is therefore liable for compensation for the depreciation.

His statement, “or dyes it”: if he dyes a garment in a color desired by people after it had been white and undesirable, then the dye belongs to the owner of the garment. This is what the author states here, but it is open to question, because dyeing necessarily involves something with which the garment is dyed, and that material belongs to the usurper. Thus, to say that the dye belongs to the owner of the garment, although the garment contains property belonging to the usurper, is questionable. It should rather be said that the usurper is entitled to the value of his dye. However, if dyeing the garment diminishes its value—for instance, by changing it to a color that lowers its value—then the usurper is liable for the depreciation.

His statement, “and planes wood”: an example is a person who takes wooden posts and fashions them into doors. In this case, the value will inevitably change and increase, and that increase belongs to the owner, because it resulted from the act of a wrongdoer. The wood shavings produced when the door is planed smooth and the like may themselves have value, and the usurper is liable for them, because he is a wrongdoer. In former times, people would use such shavings as firewood and would buy them from the carpenter.

His statement, “and the like”: such as when he turns iron into doors. Thus, if he usurps sheets of iron and turns them into doors, they belong to the owner, and the usurper is entitled to nothing.

His statement, “or grain becomes a crop”: if grain becomes a crop, then it belongs