then, through reading and review, these books become torn, some of their writing is erased, or the like, he is not liable, because he himself is entitled to benefit from them. He is one of the students of knowledge and has taken these books from the librarian, yet the librarian does not own the books, since they are endowed for students of knowledge. The librarian is merely an organizer who lends to this person, to that person, and to another. Thus, if books endowed for students of knowledge are damaged while in the possession of one of those students, he bears no liability, because he used them not by way of a loan, but by virtue of his entitlement; therefore, he is not liable.

If someone were to say: What do you say about a man who borrows a book from a library and begins writing marginal notes in it—is he liable or not? He is liable, because he has transgressed. We have heard that some people borrow hadith or fiqh books from libraries and then write marginal notes in them, such as: “The preponderant view is such-and-such,” when it is actually a weak view; or: “The view stated in this book is false”; or they say that it is an innovation. This is because some people imagine that, in a juristic disagreement, whoever holds a view contrary to what they think is required by the textual evidence is an innovator. Yet if we followed this approach, all jurists would be innovators except in matters of consensus: you would say, “You have disagreed with me, so you are an innovator,” and I would say, “You have disagreed with me, so you are an innovator.” The result would be that all jurists were innovators except in matters of consensus. No one has ever said this, nor will anyone say it. These are matters of independent legal reasoning: one scholar considers something obligatory, while another says that it is not obligatory. Are we then to call the latter an innovator?! Thus, if someone holds that camel meat does not invalidate ablution and prays after having eaten camel meat, are we to say: “You are an innovator?!” No.