servant is not his property. In this case, he must pay the customary wage, which in the example we mentioned is two hundred riyals, even though the contract was concluded for one hundred. However, this contract is invalid. Thus, the view that the lessee is liable for the customary wage is correct, because he entered into the arrangement knowingly and was aware that the lease was invalid.

But if he did not know, and the wage was contracted at one hundred, how can we hold him liable for two hundred?

The jurists explain this by saying: liability for destroying another person’s property does not differ whether one acted knowingly or ignorantly. For example, if someone employs a person whom he assumes to be his slave and puts him to work, he is liable to compensate him, even if he did not know. Yet this reasoning is open to question, for the one who employed him at a wage he believed to be valid was deceived: the lessor deceived him. Since he was deceived, liability should rest upon the deceiver. This is what sound analogy and correct reasoning require.

Accordingly, we say that in the example mentioned, the lessee must pay one hundred riyals, while the other party—the one who leased him out—must guarantee the second hundred. Thus, this free servant receives two hundred riyals, and this is justice. As for holding a person liable for what he did not undertake, when the contract was, in his view and belief, a valid one, this is questionable.

The correct view, then, is that he is liable for the customary wage; but if he was deceived, whatever exceeds the wage stipulated in the contract is due from the one who deceived him.

If we suppose that the customary wage is lower—for example, he leased him out for two hundred while the customary wage for someone like him is one hundred—are we to hold him liable for two hundred?

We say: if he knew that the lease was invalid, we hold him liable for two hundred, because he entered into it knowingly. Whatever exceeds the customary wage belongs to this servant;