whereas what is damaged without his volition, such as through slipping or the like, he is not liable for. However, the correct view is that he is not liable at all, so long as he has neither transgressed nor been negligent. Nevertheless, the applied ruling is according to the view adopted by the author.

An example of this is a joint-employed tailor. Someone brings him a piece of cloth and says, “Sew it into a shirt for me,” but he makes a mistake and sews it into trousers. He is liable.

If he says, “I forgot and mistakenly thought that you wanted it made into trousers,” we say: this does not waive liability, because you are the one who transgressed. Yes, the sin is waived, but liability—which is a right owed to another person—is not waived. This is the meaning of his statement: “whatever is damaged by his act.”

Likewise, if the owner says to him, “Sew this garment into a loose shirt,” and the piece of cloth is sufficient, but the tailor decides on his own initiative, “I will make it fitted, so as to save some of the cloth for the owner,” and does so, then he is liable, because he did something other than what he was authorized to do.

If we say that he is liable, is he entitled to payment because he laboured, sewed, spent time and thread, and used the machine, or not? He is not entitled to any wage.

If, in this case, we say that he is liable, do we say that he takes the trousers and returns a replacement piece of cloth, or do we say that the owner of the cloth takes the trousers and is given the difference in value between the shirt and the trousers?

The first is obligatory. However, if they reach an agreement on something else, there is no problem. For example, if he says, “I will take the trousers, but give me the difference between the trousers and the shirt,” there is no problem if they both agree.