The same applies to the loss of the lessee’s maintenance. For example, if a man rents a camel to perform Hajj upon it, but Allah wills that he lose his provisions: once the provisions are lost, he cannot perform Hajj—unless he borrows, and he is not obliged to borrow. The author says that the lease is not terminated, because the excuse here does not relate to the subject matter of the contract. We would say to the one who lost his provisions and abandoned Hajj: you can rent out the camel.

The stronger view in this matter is that the lease is terminated, because the owner of the camel knows that the man rented it in order to perform Hajj upon it, and that his provisions have been lost. The excuse here is evident and beyond his control; thus, it is like the occurrence of calamities.

His statement: “If he rents a house and it collapses, or land for cultivation and its water supply is cut off, or it is flooded, the lease is terminated with respect to the remainder.” If he rents a house and it collapses, whether due to floods, an earthquake—may Allah protect us—or some other cause of collapse, or if it is demolished to make way for a road for the Muslims, then the lease is terminated, because it has become impossible to obtain the agreed-upon usufruct. As for the period before that, the lease is not terminated. Hence, he said, “the lease is terminated with respect to the remainder.” What he has already benefited from remains chargeable according to what he received. But should the rent be apportioned according to the length of time, or according to the value of the usufruct?

If we say it is apportioned according to time, this means that he owes one quarter of the rent, because three months out of twelve have passed. But if we say that it is apportioned according to the value of the usufruct, we may say that the rent for these three months could equal the rent for the entire year. Consider, for example—