Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (10/71)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

This is what the jurists have stated, but perhaps more precise means are now available by which such matters may be tested.

His statement, “and the like,” refers, for example, to a doctor hired to treat a patient. If he arrives to treat the patient and finds that the patient has died, the lease is terminated. If there is another patient in the house and the doctor says, “The patient for whom you summoned me has died, so I will treat the second one and the fee will not be cancelled,” he is not to be granted this; for the subject of the contract was that particular patient, and he is no longer available.

“The lease is not terminated by the death of both contracting parties or of one of them, nor by the loss of the lessee’s maintenance or the like. But if someone rents a house and it collapses, or land for cultivation and its water supply ceases, or it is flooded, the lease is terminated with respect to the remaining period.”

His statement, “not by the death of both contracting parties or of one of them,” means that the lease is not terminated by the death of both parties to the contract, or of one of them, because the subject of the contract remains. Thus, if a person leases his house to someone and then either the lessor or the lessee dies, the lease is not terminated, since it is a binding contract. As is well known, people rent houses: one person dies, another has a child, and so forth. Likewise, if both of them die, the lease is still not terminated, because their respective rights pass to their heirs.

The author previously stated that if the rider dies and leaves no replacement, the lease is terminated—yet the rider is one of the contracting parties. Should we then say that there is a contradiction in his words, or that he followed one view earlier and another view in the second case? The author of al-Insaf adopted the latter explanation, saying that the author of al-Muqniʿ followed one view at the beginning of his discussion and another view in the second case. But in my view, the reconciliation between them is that, in the first case, the rider himself was specified: he said, “I am hiring the camel to travel to Mecca,” and then he died. Here, however, the parties contracted over a specified thing, not a specified individual. Accordingly, the lease is not terminated by the death of both contracting parties or of one of them.

هذا الذي قاله الفقهاء ﵏ لكن ربما يوجد الآن وسائل أدق من هذا يختبر بها ذلك. قوله: «ونحوه» مثل أن يستأجر طبيب لمداواة مريض، فلما وصل لمداواة المريض وإذا المريض قد مات، فإن الإجارة تنفسخ، ولو كان في البيت مريض آخر فقال الطبيب: مات المريض الذي دعوتموني له فأنا أداوي الثاني ولا تنفسخ الأجرة، فلا يُوافَق؛ لأن المعقود عليه عين المريض وقد فاتت. لَا بِمَوْتِ المُتَعَاقِدَيْنِ أَوْ أَحَدِهِمَا، وَلَا بِضَيَاعِ نَفَقَةِ المُسْتَأْجِرِ وَنَحْوِهِ. وَإِنِ اكْتَرَى دَاراً فَانْهَدَمَتْ، أَوْ أَرْضاً لِزَرْعٍ فَانْقَطَعَ مَاؤُهَا، أَوْ غَرِقَتْ، انْفَسَخَتْ الإِجَارَةُ فِي البَاقِي. قوله: «لا بموت المتعاقدين أو أحدهما» يعني لا تنفسخ الإجارة بموت المتعاقدين أو أحدهما؛ وذلك لأن المعقود عليه باقٍ، فلو أجر بيته شخصاً ثم مات المؤجر أو المستأجر لم تنفسخ الإجارة؛ لأنها عقد لازم، وكما هو معلوم الناس يستأجرون البيوت وهذا يموت وهذا يولد له، وهكذا، وكذلك لو ماتا جميعاً لم تنفسخ أيضاً؛ لأنهما إذا ماتا انتقل إلى ورثتهما. وسبق في كلام المؤلف أنه إذا مات الراكب ولم يخلف بدلاً فإنها تنفسخ، والراكب أحد المتعاقدين، فهل نقول: إن في كلامه تناقضاً، أو نقول: إنه مشى فيما سبق على قول، وفي الثانية على قول آخر؟ مشى صاحب الإنصاف على هذا، وقال: إن صاحب المقنع ﵀ مشى في أول كلامه على قول، وفي الثاني على قول آخر، ولكن عندي أن الجمع بينهما هو أنه في الأول عُيِّن الراكب، قال: أنا أستأجر البعير إلى مكة ثم مات، وهنا المتعاقدان عقدا على شيء معين لا على شخص معين، وحينئذٍ لا تنفسخ الإجارة بموت المتعاقدين أو أحدهما.