In the case of a ground lease, which here is called ṣubrah, from ṣabr (detention), the subject matter of the contract is not the property itself; rather, it is the benefit of the land. Therefore, one who enters into a ground-lease contract may demolish the house and rebuild it anew, and the landowner has nothing to say to him, because he knows that he has merely leased it to him for a specified period in return for a specified sum of money. He has no interest in the house itself or in the shop itself. This is the practice followed today. Hence, in our town, they lease land under such arrangements for five hundred years, six hundred years, and one thousand years.

In any case, I say that there is a difference between an ordinary lease and a ground lease, because in a ground lease the contract pertains only to the land, and the party taking the lease does not concern himself with the property standing upon it. But when the contract concerns the property itself, the author says that its term must be one during which the property is likely to remain intact.

If he leases him a camel for fifty years, the lease is invalid, because a camel does not live for fifty years. Likewise, if he leases him a car for one hundred years, it is invalid, because it will generally not last that long—unless it is kept unused and not driven, which is another matter. But if it is used, it will not last for such a period.

Thus, the author stipulates, with respect to leasing a specific property, that the term must be one during which the property is likely to remain intact. If it is not likely to remain intact for that period, the lease is invalid, because the benefit cannot be fully received. One of the conditions of a lease is that receiving the benefit must be possible. If, however, he leases it for a period during which the property is likely to remain intact, but it does not in fact remain intact, then the lease is dissolved, and the tenant is relieved of the corresponding portion of the rent.