His statement: “For a period, even if long, during which the property is likely to remain intact, it is valid.” This applies whether it is likely that the contracting party himself will remain alive or not. For instance, if he leases this house for sixty years, the lease is valid, because it is likely that the house will remain standing for sixty years—especially if it is newly built of concrete, in which case it will most probably last. Thus, if he leases it for this period, the lease is valid. But if it collapses before the term has ended, the lease is dissolved because the subject matter of the contract has perished, and the tenant is entitled to the corresponding portion of the rent for the period during which he did not receive the benefit.

His statement: “For a period, even if long, during which the property is likely to remain intact.” If he leases it for a long period during which it is likely not to remain standing, the apparent meaning of the author’s words is that the lease is invalid.

However, we must understand the difference between an ordinary lease, in which the contract pertains to the house itself, and a ground lease, or ḥukūra, in which the contract pertains to the benefit of the land. I believe this exists in many lands, such as the Hijaz, Najd, and Egypt: the lease concerns the land rather than the house itself. For this reason, the tenant has the right to demolish the house, alter it, and dispose of it as he wishes. In a straightforward lease, however, he has no right to dispose of the house.

There is therefore a difference between my going to a man when I intend to remain in this town for two or three years and saying, “Lease me your house,” whereupon he leases it to me. The house remains the owner’s property, and the tenant owns only the right to benefit from it. He does not even have the right to alter one of its doors or make an opening in a wall, because he has leased only the benefit; as for the property itself, he has no right to dispose of it.