for a higher rent, or allow him to remain at a lower rent. Likewise, the tenant himself may say, “The lease has been dissolved, and I will leave,” and this may be in his own interest if rental rates have fallen.

Thus, there are three categories of those who lease out an endowment:

First: one who leases out the endowment by virtue of the terms of the endowment—that is, he has supervisory authority and the power of disposal because he is among its beneficiaries.

Second: one who leases it out by virtue of a condition stipulated by the endower.

Third: one who leases it out by virtue of general jurisdiction, such as a judge.

Accordingly, the lease is not dissolved when the lessor has been stipulated to hold supervisory authority, or when he is the judge.

But if the leasing is done by a beneficiary of the endowment, not because he has been stipulated to hold supervisory authority, but merely because he is entitled to it, then there is a difference of opinion. The relied-upon position in the school of law, and the view preferred by Shaykh al-Islam, is that the lease is dissolved, whereas the author holds that it is not dissolved.

The practice among us today is that it is not dissolved. But if we say that it is not dissolved—as is the practice of the judges and of people today—may the generation of beneficiaries lease it out for a period that they are unlikely to live to see, or is that impermissible?

We say: It is impermissible. So long as we hold that the lease is not dissolved, this means that they will be infringing upon the rights of others, and that is not lawful. For example, suppose that the beneficiary of the endowment has now reached ninety years of age and leases it to someone else for fifty years, so that he would be one hundred and forty years old; it is most likely that he will not live for such a period. We say: It is not lawful for you to