that it is not a condition that the seed in sharecropping be supplied by the landowner, nor that the trees—that is, the saplings—in tree-sharing be supplied by the landowner.

Someone may ask: Why does the author explicitly negate this condition?

We say: We have a principle mentioned earlier: when scholars who author such works explicitly negate something, it is to rebut a view that has been held. Otherwise, their silence about stipulating it would itself indicate that it is not a condition. But when he explicitly negates it, it is as though he is pointing to a view that affirms it. Thus, when he says, “Such-and-such is not a condition,” we say that this alludes to a contrary view and serves to refute it. Some scholars hold that, in sharecropping, the seed must be supplied by the landowner. Thus, if you give someone land to cultivate, you must also give him the seed; if the seed comes from him, the arrangement is invalid. They reason that sharecropping is analogous to muḍāraba: sharecropping is entrusting an asset to someone to work with in return for a share of its profit, while muḍāraba is entrusting capital to someone to invest and work with in return for a share of its profit. Since it is analogous to muḍāraba, the capital must come from the capital provider; likewise, the seed must come from the landowner, not from the worker.

The correct view is that this is not a condition, and this is the view adopted by the author of the text. The evidence for his view is both negative and affirmative.

As for the negative evidence, we say that the basic principle is that there are no conditions, and that contracts between Muslims are permissible without conditions. Therefore, we say to anyone who prohibits a type of contract: “Bring your evidence.” And to anyone who prohibits a type of contract unless a condition is met, we likewise say: “Bring your evidence.” For if prohibiting a contract in principle requires evidence, then prohibiting a particular feature within a contract likewise requires evidence. This is because forbidding a contract except with a particular feature or condition is, in reality, a prohibition, though not an absolute one; rather,