The poet says of the cypress:

It has a pleasing appearance, yet it bears no fruit.

As for the tamarisk, it does bear fruit, but its fruit is not edible; moreover, it bears little fruit. Therefore, a sharecropping contract concerning it is not valid, because the labour spent on it yields no profit. The author says, “trees that bear edible fruit,” and this is the apparent meaning of his words.

Some scholars have said that it is permissible with respect to trees that bear no fruit if their branches are beneficial—for example, if their branches may be cut and made into small doors or the like—or with lote trees whose leaves may be put to use. It is also permissible with respect to trees that bear fruit which is not edible but is nevertheless sought after, such as the tamarisk: it bears fruit that may be taken and used in houses to tan hides. Thus, it is a sought-after fruit, though not edible.

This view is correct, because the principle is that the worker should receive something in return for his labour—whether edible fruit, non-edible but useful fruit, or a share in cutting the trees themselves once they have reached full growth. There is no objection to this, for it benefits both parties. What difference is there between saying that branches are cut, sold, and put to use, and saying that fruit is harvested and eaten?

Thus, the subject matter of a sharecropping contract is trees, and it is stipulated that they bear fruit and that their fruit be edible. This is the first form.

His statement, “concerning fruit already present”: an example is a man who owns a date palm which has borne fruit, but he is weary of watering and tending it. He therefore enters into a sharecropping contract with someone concerning it, saying, “I enter into a sharecropping contract with you concerning this fruit until it is harvested.” There is nothing wrong with this.

If someone were to say, “This amounts to selling the fruit before its soundness has become evident,”