as a mosque and a means of purification.” (1) For “the earth” is a general term, whereas “soil” is specific; thus, the general term is restricted by the specific.

This has been challenged on the grounds that when a general expression is qualified by something that accords with the ruling of the general expression, it is not truly a qualification.

The formulation of this principle is that mentioning one of the particulars included in a general expression with a ruling that accords with the ruling of the general expression does not entail restricting it …

For example, if you say, “Honor the students,” this is general. Then, if you say, “Honor Zayd,” who is one of the students, this does not restrict the general statement, because you have mentioned Zayd with a ruling that accords with the general statement.

But if you say, “Do not honor Zayd,” and he is one of the students, this becomes a restriction of the general statement, because I have mentioned him with a ruling that differs from the general statement.

An example of this is the view of some scholars concerning the Prophet’s ﷺ statement: “For silver coinage, one quarter of a tenth is due.” (2) They held that it restricts the general proofs indicating that zakah is obligatory on silver without qualification, (3) because he said, “For silver coinage,” and silver coinage refers to minted currency.

It may be said: Even if we grant that silver coinage means minted silver, mentioning one of the particulars included in a general expression with a ruling that accords with the general expression does not entail restricting it.

This principle—namely, that mentioning particular cases with a ruling that accords with the general expression does not entail