then it is a gift, because once he hunted it, it became his property. If he then gives it to the principal, it is a gift, not something transferred through agency.

His statement, “and herbage”: if he appoints someone as his agent and says, “So-and-so, I appoint you to cut the herbage in this area for me,” and the agent cuts it, then the author holds that this is valid and that, once he has cut it, it belongs to the principal.

A person must clarify what he means when using ambiguous terms. Nowadays, the word “herbage” may refer either to what grows from the earth, as in the hadith, “Its herbage is not to be cut,” (1) or to that which is used as an intoxicant. Therefore, in such ambiguous matters—especially when the prohibited meaning is what readily comes to the minds of ordinary people—one must explain and clarify the matter so that people may have clear understanding. Thus, the author’s statement, “and herbage,” means that which grows from the earth.

His statement, “and the like,” means other permissible things, such as gathering truffles. Truffles are not considered herbage; hence, one may extract truffles even from land within Mecca, because they are not herbage.

His statement, “but not ẓihār, liʿān, or oaths”: agency is not valid in these matters, because they are connected to the person performing them himself. Thus, if a man appoints someone to pronounce ẓihār against his wife, and that person goes to the woman and says to her, “To your husband, you are like his mother’s back,” then ẓihār is not established, because this is a legal act connected to the person performing it himself and therefore cannot be delegated. However, if he appoints him to pronounce a divorce, this is valid, because it is a dissolution,