for this is that if the principal cannot be produced, we are unable to exact retaliation from the surety, and the suretyship is therefore of no benefit.

The governing principle in this matter is derived from this reasoning: anyone from whom the obligation cannot be exacted if the principal absents himself cannot validly stand surety.

Another example: a woman detains her husband, who has another wife, and says, “You have not given me my allotted turn. The coming night is mine, and you did not come two nights ago—or perhaps four nights ago—and now we must go to court.” He says to her, “Give me time,” but she replies, “I will not give you time.” Then a man rises and says, “I will stand surety that the man will come to you.” This is not possible, because if the principal does not come, the surety cannot take the principal’s place.

Thus, the rule is that whenever the obligation cannot be exacted from the surety, the suretyship is invalid, because it serves no purpose. The rulings of Allah are not to be treated as play and frivolity that serve no purpose.

His statement, “The consent of the surety is required, but not that of the guaranteed obligation,” is self-evident, because the surety will be undertaking an obligation, and if he does not consent to it, he cannot be bound by it. Nor can the beneficiary of the suretyship have a surety except at his own request. Thus, if someone comes forward to stand surety for him, and the beneficiary says, “There is no need for you to stand surety for so-and-so; I know him,” then there is no suretyship. This is because the beneficiary may waive the suretyship even after it has been established; so his declining it from the outset is all the more valid.

His statement, “but not that of the guaranteed obligation”: in reality, the guaranteed obligation is the debt or the right. The sound wording is: “but not that of the principal”—that is, the principal’s consent is not required. Thus, if someone says to another person, “I will stand surety for so-and-so,” and he says—