The answer is: yes, it is sold, and the person in whose favor the acknowledgement was made recovers from the pledgor, because it was the pledgor who caused its loss—provided that he maintains his acknowledgement that it belongs to someone else.
His statement, “or that it committed an offense”: that is, the pledged property.
His statement, “it is accepted”: the pronoun refers to the acknowledgement—that is, the pledgor’s acknowledgement.
His statement, “against himself”: here, the pronoun refers to the pledgor. It is accepted against him, but not against the pledgee.
His statement, “and judgment is made in accordance with his acknowledgement after it is discharged”: that is, in accordance with the implications of his acknowledgement after the pledge has been discharged. Thus, if he acknowledges that it belongs to someone else, we say: once the pledge is discharged, the person in whose favor the acknowledgement was made may take it. If it had committed an offense, then either its owner compensates for it and says, “I will pay the full compensation for the offense,” or he hands the slave over to the victim, or he sells the slave and gives his value to the victim.
The scenario is as follows: a man pledges a slave, and after the pledge contract has been concluded, he says, “This slave has committed an offense against so-and-so,” whether against his life, by an injury less than that, or against his property. When a slave commits an offense, liability for that offense attaches to the slave himself. Thus, his owner is told: either pay the compensation for the offense, hand over the slave in compensation for the offense, or sell the slave and hand his price over to the victim—three alternatives.
The pledgor claims that the slave committed an offense against so-and-so. It is known that the victim’s right, which attaches to the slave himself, is stronger than the attachment of the pledgee’s right. The pledgee’s right is attached to the pledged property as security, not as a guarantee. Thus, the pledgor seeks by this acknowledgement to invalidate the pledgee’s right. So it is said to him: your acknowledgement is accepted in one respect but not in another. With respect to the victim, against whom you have acknowledged that the slave committed an offense, the acknowledgement is accepted; but with respect to the pledgee’s right, it is not accepted,