“Every trustee whose claim to have returned the property is accepted.” (1)

Accordingly, if the pledgee claims that he returned the pledged property to the pledgor, we do not accept his statement; rather, the pledgor’s statement is accepted.

It should be known that whoever’s statement is accepted must take an oath, due to the Prophet’s statement, peace and blessings be upon him: “The oath is upon the one who denies.” (2)

His statement, “that it was juice, not wine,” means that the pledgor’s statement is accepted when he claims that it was juice rather than wine. However, this applies only in a particular case: a contract in which a pledge was stipulated. Hence, the qualification is necessary: “in a contract in which a pledge was stipulated.”

For example, the pledgee may say, “I sold you this item on condition that you pledge this juice to me.” The buyer agrees and pledges him the juice. Then the pledgee retracts and says, “The juice was wine,” meaning that the pledge is invalid, since if it was wine, the pledge would not be valid. Once the pledge is invalid, the seller says, “I have the right to rescind the sale, because I stipulated a pledge, and it has become clear that the pledge is invalid. Therefore, I have the right to rescind, since the contract is now without a pledge, and I sold it only on the condition of a pledge.”

The pledgor then says, “It was juice, not wine.” If it was juice, the pledge was valid; and if it was valid, the seller has no option to rescind.

If someone were to ask, “Why do we accept the pledgor’s statement in this matter but not the pledgee’s?”

The answer is that the basic presumption is that a thing remains as it originally was. Thus, the presumption is that it was sound and had not fermented, since it was originally juice. Therefore, its fermentation must have taken place