part of his right; and obtaining part of his right is better than receiving nothing at all. As for the pledgor, as mentioned above, it is inconceivable that he would delay repayment beyond its due time if he knows that the pledged item is worth more than the debt, for no one would accept this. Even if he had to borrow in order to repay the debt, he would do so, lest he lose out on that increase. This answers the objection and resolves the difficulty.

Thus, the correct view is that if he pledges an item and says, “If I bring you what is due to you by such-and-such a time, otherwise the pledge is yours,” this is a valid and binding condition.

The pledgor’s statement is accepted regarding the amount of the debt, the pledged item, its return, and whether it is juice rather than wine. If he acknowledges that it belongs to someone else, or that it has caused an injury, his acknowledgment is accepted against himself, and judgment is made according to his acknowledgment after the pledge has been redeemed—unless the pledgee confirms him.

His statement, “The pledgor’s statement is accepted regarding the amount of the debt,” means that when the debt falls due, the pledgor brings one thousand riyals to the pledgee and says, “This is your debt; give me the pledged item.” The pledgee replies, “The debt is not one thousand riyals; it is five thousand riyals.” The pledgor says, “Rather, it is one thousand riyals.” The author says: “The pledgor’s statement is accepted.” This is conditional upon the pledgee having no evidence. But if the pledgee has evidence, then the statement supported by the evidence is accepted. In this example, the evidence supports the pledgee, so the pledgor is liable for five thousand.