An example of increasing the pledged property is as follows: a man borrows fifty thousand from someone, and the lender says to him, “I want collateral.” He replies, “This car of mine,” so the lender takes it, and the contract is concluded on that basis: the pledged property is one car. Then the creditor—the pledgee—realizes that the car is insufficient to secure the debt, so he asks the one who pledged him the car to pledge another car as well. This is permissible. But can the debtor be compelled to pledge the other car?

The answer is no, he cannot be compelled. But if the two agree, there is no problem, since this involves neither injustice nor usury.

As for increasing the debt, this is not permissible.

For example, a man borrows fifty thousand from someone and says to him, “The house is pledged to you as collateral.” Then the debtor needs additional funds, so he comes to the pledgee and says, “Lend me [more].” The pledgee says, “Give me collateral.” He replies, “The original collateral.” Thus, the later debt is included under the original pledge. The author says that this is not permissible, because the pledged property is already encumbered by the first sum of money.

The correct view, however, is that it is permissible and that there is nothing wrong with increasing the debt, because it is done with the consent of both parties and serves the pledgor’s interest. This is the view of some scholars. The reason is that the pledgee has secured his own interest; then, if the pledgor comes and asks him to add something to the original debt that will be covered by the pledge, this benefits the pledgor. What prevents one of the two parties from having an interest, when it is an interest involving no usury?

As for their statement, “That which is already encumbered cannot be further encumbered,” it is correct if the one imposing the encumbrance is