For example, if the pledgor says, “I want to lease out the house and benefit from its rent; fifty thousand constitutes a substantial portion of the debt I owe,” and the pledgee refuses, he is compelled to agree—provided this is done in a manner that does not jeopardize the pledgee’s right. If it would jeopardize the pledgee’s right—for instance, if the pledgor seeks to lease it to someone who would damage the house by breaking its doors and windows, ruining its paintwork, and the like—then the pledgee may refuse, because that would harm him: when this pledged property is sold, its value will be diminished. He may therefore refuse. But if there is no diminution, then whichever of them refuses is compelled, because leaving it unused and neglected entails a waste of property and harms the pledgor.

His statement, “without the other’s permission,” indicates that if either of them permits the other to dispose of it, this is permissible. Thus, if the pledgee says to the pledgor, “Lease it to whomever you wish,” and he leases it out, there is no objection. But where is the rent to be kept?

The answer is: it follows the pledged property and is held wherever cash is kept until the debt falls due. Likewise, if the pledgor permits the pledgee and says, “There is no problem; lease it out,” then he may lease it out. When he receives the rent, he deducts its amount from the debt owed to him. This is the necessary ruling: if either of them refuses, he is compelled, so long as this entails no harm to the pledgee.

His statement, “except for the pledgor’s emancipation, which is valid though sinful; its value is then taken as security in its place,” means: except for the pledgor’s emancipation. This is a case of the verbal noun being attributed to its agent; that is, except for the pledgor’s emancipation of the pledged slave. It is effective, and the pledged slave is emancipated, but the pledgor incurs sin. He is held liable for its value, which is taken as security in its place.