Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (9/140)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

his qualification, “voluntarily,” because the basic presumption concerning an act is that it is done voluntarily.

The correct view is contrary to this: possession is not a condition, nor is its continued retention a condition.

“No disposal of it by either of them is effective without the other’s permission, except for the pledgor’s emancipation of a slave, which is valid though sinful; its value is then taken as security in its place. The growth of the pledged property, its earnings, and compensation for injury inflicted upon it are attached to it. Its maintenance is the responsibility of the pledgor, as are its shroud and the rent for its storage.”

His statement, “No disposal of it by either of them is effective,” means that if either of them—that is, the pledgor or the pledgee—makes any disposition of it, that disposition is ineffective. Why?

The answer is that the pledgor’s disposition is ineffective because the pledged property is encumbered by another’s right, and his disposal of it would nullify that right. As for the pledgee, he has no right to dispose of it because he is neither its owner nor one acting in the owner’s place. The pledged property belongs to the pledgor: its benefit is his, and its liability rests upon him. Therefore, neither the pledgor nor the pledgee may validly dispose of the pledged property.

The apparent meaning of the author’s words is that this applies whether the disposition transfers ownership of the property itself or of its usufruct. Accordingly, the pledgor may neither sell nor lease out the pledged property. On this basis, the pledged property remains unused if each of them refuses to permit the other.

For example, if a person pledges a house as security for a debt of five hundred thousand, while the rent of the house is worth fifty thousand, and the pledgor asks the pledgee to lease out the house so that he may benefit from its rent, but the pledgee refuses; or if the pledgee asks the pledgor to lease out the house but the pledgor refuses—then the house remains unused, and no one benefits from it. As you can see, this view entails a degree of wastefulness of property.

The correct view is that if either of them requests a transaction that does not harm the pledgee’s right, it is obligatory to comply with him, and the one who refuses is compelled to make use of this benefit.

قوله باختياره؛ لأن الأصل في الفعل أن يكون اختيارياً. والصواب خلاف هذا فليس القبض شرطاً ولا استدامته شرطاً. وَلَا يَنْفُذُ تَصَرُّفُ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا فِيهِ بغَيْرِ إِذْنِ الآخَرِ إلاَّ عِتْقَ الرَّاهِنِ فَإِنَّهُ يَصِحُّ مَعَ الإِثْمِ وَتُؤْخَذُ قِيمَتُهُ رَهْنَاً مَكَانَهُ وَنَمَاءُ الرَّهْنِ وَكَسْبُهُ وَأرْشُ الجِنَايَةِ عَلَيْهِ مُلْحَقٌ بِهِ وَمُؤونَتُهُ عَلَى الرَّاهِنِ وَكَفَنُهُ وَأُجْرَةُ مَخْزَنِهِ. قوله: «ولا ينفذ تصرف واحد منهما فيه» يعني لو أن أحدهما أي: الراهن أو المرتهن، تصرف فيه بأي تصرف فإنه لا ينفذ، لماذا؟ الجواب: أما كون الراهن لا ينفذ تصرفه؛ فلأن الرهن مشغول بحق غيره، وتصرفه فيه إبطال لحق الغير، وأما كون المرتهن لا يملك التصرف؛ فلأن المرتهن ليس مالكاً ولا قائماً مقام المالك، فالرهن ملك للراهن له غُنمه وعليه غُرمه، فلا يصح أن يتصرف، لا الراهن، ولا المرتهن في المرهون. وظاهر كلام المؤلف سواء كان هذا التصرف نقلاً لملكية العين أو لمنافعها، فمعناه أن الراهن لا يبيع المرهون ولا يؤجره، وعلى هذا فيبقى الرهن معطلاً إذا امتنع كل منهما أن يأذن للآخر. فلو أن الإنسان رهن بيتاً في دين، والدين خمسمائة ألف، والبيت تساوي أجرته خمسين ألفاً، فطلب الراهن من المرتهن أن يؤجر البيت لينتفع بالأجرة فأبى المرتهن، أو طلب المرتهن من الراهن أن يؤجر البيت فأبى الراهن، فإن البيت يبقى معطلاً لا ينتفع به أحد، وهذا القول كما ترى فيه شيء من إضاعة المال. والصواب أنه إذا طلب أحدهما عقداً لا يُضِرُّ بحق المرتهن فإن الواجب إجابته، وأن الممتنع منهما يجبر على استغلال هذا النفع.