Al-Sharḥ al-Mumtiʿ - Ibn al-'Uthaymin - (9/139)

Al-Sharḥ al-MumtiʿIbn al-'Uthaymin

on the understanding that it would be held by him as a deposit, with the pledgor acting on his behalf, then, according to the author’s view, its binding force lapses because he has returned it to the pledgor. The author states this without qualification, stipulating only one condition: that it be done voluntarily. According to the author’s view, if the pledgor then disposes of it by selling it or the like, his disposal is lawful, since the binding force has lapsed. This indicates the invalidity of this view, for when a view entails something objectionable, that indicates its invalidity.

His statement, “If he returns it to him, its binding force is restored,” means that if the pledgor returns it to the pledgee, its binding force does not require the contract to be renewed. Rather, it becomes binding again merely by being returned to the pledgee. Thus, this pledge is binding on Saturday, non-binding on Sunday, binding on Monday, and non-binding on Tuesday.

His statement, “If he gives it back to the pledgor,” indicates that if he gives it to someone other than the pledgor, its binding force does not lapse—for example, if he entrusts it to a trustworthy person. However, he cannot entrust it to anyone without the pledgor’s approval, because the pledgor has the right of ownership, while the pledgee has the right to security.

His statement, “If he returns it to him,” means that if the pledgor returns it to someone other than the pledgee, its binding force is not restored. However, if that person is the pledgee’s agent and the pledgor returns it to him, its binding force is restored.

His statement, “If he returns it to him, its binding force is restored,” does not include the qualification, “voluntarily.” Thus, if the pledgee went to the pledgor and said, “Give me the pledged property, or I will do such-and-such,” and then did so until the pledgor returned it to him, its binding force is restored. This is because such compulsion is exercised lawfully: his right in this pledged property still remains, so he has not compelled him to do something to which he has no right. This is the apparent meaning of the author’s words, but it may be said that the author omitted

على أنه وديعة عنده وأنه نائب منابه، فاللزوم على رأي المؤلف يزول لأنه رده إلى الراهن، وقد أطلق المؤلف ولم يشترط إلا شرطاً واحداً وهو «باختياره»، وعلى رأي المؤلف لو تصرف فيه الراهن ببيع ونحوه فتصرفه حلال؛ لأن اللزوم زال، وهذا مما يدل على بطلان هذا القول؛ لأن القول إذا لزم منه شيء ينكر دل ذلك على بطلانه. وقوله: «فإن رده إليه عاد لزومه إليه» فإن رده الراهن إلى المرتهن، فلا يحتاج لزومه مرة ثانية إلى تجديد العقد، فيعود لازماً بمجرد رده إلى المرتهن، فصار هذا الرهن يوم السبت لازماً، يوم الأحد غير لازم، ويوم الاثنين لازماً، ويوم الثلاثاء غير لازم. وقوله: «فإن أخرجه إلى الراهن» علم منه أنه لو أخرجه إلى غير الراهن فلا يزول اللزوم، مثل أن يودعه ثقة، لكنه لا يمكن أن يودعه أحداً إلا بموافقة الراهن؛ لأن الراهن له حق الملكية والمرتهن له حق التوثقة. وقوله: «فإن رده إليه» فلو رده الراهن إلى غير المرتهن فلا يعود اللزوم، نعم لو كان هذا الشخص وكيلاً للمرتهن فرده الراهن إليه عاد اللزوم. وقوله: «فإن رده إليه عاد لزومه إليه» ولم يقل باختياره، فلو ذهب المرتهن إلى الراهن وقال: أعطني الرهن وإلا فعلت، وفعلت حتى رده إليه، فهنا يعود اللزوم؛ لأن هذا الإكراه بحق؛ لأن حقه ما زال موجوداً في هذا الرهن، فهو لم يكرهه على شيء ليس من حقه، هذا ظاهر كلام المؤلف، لكن قد يقال: إن المؤلف أسقط