His statement, “Its continued possession is a condition,” adds a further requirement to possession itself. That is, continued possession is a condition for the pledge to remain binding. Thus, if the pledgee takes possession of it for a day or two and then returns it to the pledgor, its binding force lapses, because possession must continue.

For example, a man pledges his car to someone as security for a debt he owes him, and the pledgee—the creditor—takes possession of it. After two days, the pledgor comes to him and says, “Please give me the car, for I need it; it is simply standing with you, and you derive no benefit from it.” He replies, “Yes,” and returns it to the pledgor. In this case, the pledge ceases to be binding, and the pledgor may dispose of it. This is according to the author’s view, which is why he says:

“If he voluntarily releases it to the pledgor, its binding force lapses; but if he takes it back from him, its binding force is restored.”

All of this is based on the view that possession is a condition for a pledge to be binding, and that its continued possession is likewise a condition.

His words, “voluntarily,” imply that if he releases it under duress, the pledge remains binding. For example, after delivering the pledged item, the pledgor comes to the pledgee and says, “Either give me back my pledged property, or I will kill you,” and he is capable of carrying out his threat. The pledgee then says, “Take the pledged property.” Its binding force remains, because he was compelled.

If the pledgee’s father were to say to him, “Give the pledgor his car so that he may benefit from it, while it remains pledged,” and he gave the car to the pledgor out of dutifulness to his father, then the pledge would not remain binding, because his father did not compel him, and he acted voluntarily.

And if it is supposed that the pledgee wished to travel and so returned the pledged item to the pledgor