this house to you.” That is not valid, because it cannot be sold; and whatever cannot be sold cannot be pledged.

The fourth example: Another man says, “I want collateral from you.” He replies, “I pledge my house to you,” but the house has already been pledged to a previous person. This is not valid, because it cannot be sold, and property already encumbered cannot be further encumbered.

If he says, “I pledge to you what is in the womb of this ewe,” this is not permissible according to the stated rule, because it may not be sold. The correct view, however, is that pledging it is valid, since a pledge is not an exchange contract such that it must be precisely specified and known. The fetus in the womb may be in one of four states: it may be worth more than the debt, less than it, equal to it, or it may die. If it dies, or is born defective such that it is not worth the amount of the debt, the creditor’s right has not been lost. At most, the security upon which he had hoped has diminished or vanished, but his right remains. If the fetus is born worth more than the debt, then it exceeds the value of the debt. It is permissible to pledge an asset worth more than the debt. So long as the matter is merely one of security, and the creditor’s right remains and will not be lost, the correct view is that it is permissible. The Messenger, peace and blessings be upon him, prohibited only sales involving excessive uncertainty (1). There is a difference between a sale, in which each countervalue is intended to be carefully ascertained against the other, and something intended solely as security: if it is obtained, that is an added measure of completeness; and if it is not obtained, the right remains.

His statement, “even a mukātab,” refers to a slave who has purchased his freedom from his master for a deferred price payable in two or more installments.

A contract of manumission is prescribed in the Sacred Law; indeed, some scholars held that it is obligatory.