when it dries?” They said, “Yes,” so he forbade that”—that is, the sale of fresh dates for dried dates.

As for the reasoning, selling fresh dates for dried dates lacks one of the required conditions: equality.

“It is permissible to sell its flour for its flour if they are equal in fineness, its cooked form for its cooked form, and its bread for its bread if they are equal in dryness; likewise, its juice for its juice, and its fresh dates for its fresh dates. No usurious commodity may be sold for another of its own kind when one of them, or both of them, includes something of a different kind.”

His statement, “It is permissible to sell its flour for its flour if they are equal in fineness,” means, for example, that the grain was ground in the same mill and the two amounts are of equal weight. Thus, I may sell you wheat flour in exchange for flour made from luqaymi—a variety of wheat grain, not a distinct kind—provided that they are equal in fineness. If they differ in fineness, such that one is very fine and the other less so, this is not permissible, because the finer it is, the more the grain spreads out, making equality impossible. However, as we said earlier, if we weigh them and they are equal, there is no harm.

His statement, “Its cooked form for its cooked form,” is like exchanging cow’s ghee for cow’s ghee, both having been cooked. This is permissible, because there is no difference between them.

His statement, “And its bread for its bread if they are equal in dryness,” means that it is likewise permissible to sell its bread for its bread if they are equal in dryness. But how is bread to be measured when exchanged for bread?

The answer is that they say equality in the case of bread is determined by weight, because measurement by volume is impracticable. But if we say that it is determined by weight, does it cease to be a commodity measured by volume?

The answer is: it does not cease to be so, because we departed from the original standard,