An example of this is a man who sells someone a sack of wheat at such-and-such a price per sāʿ, then a flood comes and carries it away, spoils it, and sweeps it off. In this case, the destruction is caused by a heavenly calamity. Likewise, if lightning strikes and burns it, or winds blow and carry it away, the liability rests with the seller. If he has received the price, he must return it to the buyer; and if he has not received it, it remains with the buyer.

Similar to a heavenly calamity is destruction caused by one from whom compensation cannot be recovered. For instance, if it is destroyed by an animal belonging to him eating it, or by soldiers consuming it—that is, the ruler’s troops pass by and take it—then this is treated like a heavenly calamity, because compensation cannot be recovered. The animal that ate it cannot be held liable, nor can the army that passed by and took it be held liable. Therefore, we say: whatever destroys it but cannot be held liable is treated as a heavenly calamity.

His statement, “If it is destroyed by a specified person from whom compensation can be recovered.”

His statement, “The buyer is given the choice between rescinding [the sale], affirming [it], and demanding its replacement from the one who destroyed it”: these are three matters. If he affirms the sale, he may demand compensation from the one who destroyed it. Accordingly, the phrase, “demanding it from the one who destroyed it,” is not itself one of the options; rather, it follows from affirming the sale. That is, if he affirms it, he demands its replacement from the one who destroyed it.

Thus, if a measured commodity or something similar is destroyed, there are four cases:

First: that the seller destroys it.

Second: that it is destroyed by a heavenly calamity.

Third: that it is destroyed by something from which compensation cannot be recovered.

Fourth: that it is destroyed by a person from whom compensation can be recovered.