then she has lied and he is of the truthful.” [Joseph 12:26–27]—if not circumstantial evidence?!

And what led the jurists to say: If a divorced woman claims that the sitting-room furnishings and its incense burner belong to her, while the husband says, “Rather, they belong to me,” then the husband’s statement is accepted—unless there is circumstantial evidence?!

The point is that circumstantial indicators are evidence. Thus, when a person claims something contrary to what is apparent, the statement of his opponent is accepted, because contradicting what is apparent is an indication that he is lying.

His statement, “or a condition,” means: if they also differ over a stipulated condition, the basic presumption is that it did not exist.

For example, a man sells his house to another for a price, then the seller claims that he stipulated the right to reside in it for one year. The buyer’s statement is accepted, because he denies the condition, and the basic presumption is that it does not exist.

Likewise, he sells him a slave, and the buyer says, “I stipulated that he be literate,” while the seller says, “You did not stipulate that he be literate.” The seller’s statement is accepted unless there is circumstantial evidence. Here we may give an example: suppose that this slave was sold for ten thousand riyals, whereas if he were illiterate he would be worth two thousand riyals. In that case, the buyer’s statement is accepted because of the circumstantial evidence: if he were illiterate, he would not be sold for ten thousand, but only for two thousand. Thus, in this case the buyer’s statement is accepted.

But if he was purchased by a merchant, and it is most likely that he bought him simply to serve as a scribe in his shop, and the buyer says, “I stipulated that he be literate,” while the seller says, “No,” then this is an indication specific to the claimant, who is the buyer, and not an apparent indication of general applicability.