His statement, “except when emancipation is stipulated”: this is an exception. Thus, if he sells a slave to someone and says, “On condition that you emancipate him,” and the buyer agrees, then both the sale and the condition are valid. This is because the Sacred Law strongly encourages emancipation and urges it; moreover, a purchase may be intended for the purpose of emancipation. One who owes an expiation may buy a slave in order to emancipate him, so this does not conflict with the purpose of the contract.

If someone were to ask, “Why does he stipulate that the buyer emancipate him rather than emancipating him himself?”

We reply: the seller may, for example, be in need of dirhams. It is well known that if he sells the slave on condition of emancipation, the price will be reduced because the buyer has undertaken this condition. Thus, this benefits the seller by meeting his need for money, and it benefits the buyer through the reduction in price, for it will undoubtedly be reduced. It also benefits him in that he acquires the right of patronage, since the buyer is the one who carries out the emancipation, and thus the right of patronage belongs to him.

His statement, “except when emancipation is stipulated,” means that if the buyer purchases it with emancipation stipulated as a condition upon him, but then begins to procrastinate and ultimately refuses, the commentator says that the buyer is compelled to emancipate him, because it was stipulated as a condition upon him (1).

His statement, “I sell it to you on condition that you pay me the price within three days; otherwise, there is no sale between us: this is valid,” means: on condition that you give me the price before three days have passed; otherwise, there is no sale between us. This condition is valid, because the suspension here is a suspension of rescission, and not