and alarmists are numerous, it should not engage in jihad, because in jihad there must be a preponderant expectation of victory. If defeat is the more likely outcome, it is not permissible to expose the Muslims to such risk. This is no trivial matter, nor is it merely a question of individuals being lost; rather, it constitutes humiliation even for Islam itself—unless the imam is compelled to do so. For jihad is of two types: offensive jihad and defensive jihad. Defensive jihad is obligatory in all circumstances, whereas offensive jihad is as we have described.

Second: the imam must organize and arrange the army, dividing it according to the needs of the situation, in accordance with sound, carefully considered plans devised by specialists. We know necessarily that armies in the present age differ from armies of the past. In the past, an army was called a fivefold formation because it was divided into five sections: the vanguard, right flank, left flank, rear guard, and center. A commander would be assigned to each section, and so forth. Today, however, weapons have become diverse and specializations numerous. The imam should therefore take all of this into account, so that the army does not appear disorganized when the two armies meet in battle.

May he send scouts—that is, spies—to observe the enemy and learn their intelligence?

The answer is: yes. Indeed, he must do so if the need arises, because this is among the means by which he seeks assistance in fighting.

His statement: “He may grant extra shares at the outset: one quarter after the fifth has been set aside, and on the return journey: one third after it.” The phrase “he may” refers to the imam. This means that if the imam