for example. If the son or daughter’s engagement in this act of obedience harms the father or mother, then they may prevent him or her from doing it, and the child must refrain, because dutifulness to one’s parents is obligatory, whereas voluntary worship is not obligatory.

His statement, “if his parents are Muslims,” apparently indicates that even if they are slaves, he may not undertake voluntary jihad without their permission. For he did not say, “if his parents are free Muslims”; rather, he said, “if his parents are Muslims,” without qualification. Thus, if they are slaves and they prevent him from undertaking voluntary jihad, they have the right to do so, and he must refrain.

If his parents are disbelievers and they prevent him from undertaking voluntary jihad, must he obey them?

The answer is no, due to his statement, “if his parents are Muslims,” and because we know that disbelieving parents only prevent their child from jihad in order to protect the disbelievers and defend them, not out of compassion for their child or concern for his safety.

If the parents are immoral sinners who dislike jihad and dislike those who are upright, and who dislike the word of truth being made supreme, yet they are Muslims, is their permission a condition for voluntary jihad? For some people, when others go out for jihad, prevent their sons from going—not because they fear for them. They say, “Go wherever you wish, but do not go for jihad.” We know that this is not out of fear for him, but because of their hatred for jihad.

The apparent meaning of the author’s words is that he may not undertake voluntary jihad without their permission, and their intention is left to Allah. Yet there is some reservation regarding this. If we know that they did not prevent him out of concern for him, but rather because they dislike the jihad he undertakes against the disbelievers and his assistance to the Muslims, then obeying them is open to question.